Monday, December 05, 2016

Secularism, Islamophobia and the politics of religion.

Secularism, Islamophobia and the politics of religion.

John Molyneux

First published in Irish Marxist Review 16. 


There are moments when a single flash of lightning lights up the night sky and illuminates the whole landscape below which was previously shrouded in darkness. Such was the moment when Michael Brown was shot by a US cop in Ferguson, Missouri on 9 August 2014. And such was the moment when photographs appeared of armed police forcing a Muslim woman to disrobe on a French beach. It both illuminated and encapsulated in concentrated form the whole offensive against Muslims that has been waged by French politicians and the French state, not just for the last year or so but for the last twenty years.

Of course this offensive is by no means confined to France and has a thoroughly international character – essentially it originated in the United States and is raging in Britain, and many other places including Ireland. Nevertheless it does seem particularly intense in France at this point in time and has the peculiarity of being waged in the name of ‘secularism’ and ‘the French Republic’ and this ideological device has given it a significant radical cover and legitimacy and secured for it a degree of ‘left’ support and acquiescence higher than is generally the case elsewhere. This is because secularism has long been seen as a ‘value’ or ‘principle’ that the left, including revolutionary socialists, should defend and advocate. This article is an examination of the relations between secularism, Islamophobia, racism and the politics of religion.

As it happens Ireland and Irish history constitutes an interesting and  useful vantage point from which to start this examination.

The View from Ireland

Because of the pretty much unique position of dominance held by the Catholic Church in Irish society during much of the 20th century the issue of secularism is alive and well in Ireland today. It is there in the Repeal the 8th campaign and in the slogans of the pro-choice movement: ‘Not the church and not the state! Women should decide their fate!’ and ‘Get your rosaries off our ovaries!’. It is there in way in which the horrible legacy of the Magdalene Laundries, the Industrial Schools and the brutal Christian Brothers still haunt the memories of so many of our people. And it is still there in the inflated power that the Church hierarchy still exercises over our schools.

On all these issues any socialist will stand full square for the principles of secularism. There should be a complete separation of church and state. We are for complete freedom of religious belief and religious worship but as a private matter. No religion should hold a position of power or privilege in the state or be state funded. It is also probably the case that many, though certainly not all, socialists are non-believers and while not wanting in way to prohibit religion nevertheless look forward, like Karl Marx, to a world in which people no longer require the services of the opium of the masses.

But shift the focus back in time to 1916 and the Irish Revolution. How would we respond to an argument that ran as follows?

“The 1916 Rising was led by Catholics, in particular that well known Catholic fanatic Padraig Pearse. By far the majority of the Volunteers were Catholics and even the socialist leader of the Irish Citizen Army, James Connolly, was a Catholic of sorts. Moreover, the Proclamation which constituted the programme of the Rising explicitly states that it is written ‘In the name of God’ and that ‘We place the cause of the Irish Republic under the protection of the Most High God, Whose blessings we invoke upon our arms’. Therefore it is clear that this was a sectarian Catholic uprising intent on establishing a traditionalist authoritarian Catholic state and that no socialist should have given or should give retrospectively any support whatsoever to such a backward obscurantist movement dominated by a religion from the middle ages. Indeed objectively it was forces of the British Army, rough as they may been at times, who represented progress and had to be backed by all those who value freedom, the enlightenment, and especially the rights of women”.

The answer that I trust every socialist, beginning with those ardent atheists Marx, Engels, Lenin and Trotsky, would give to this is argument would be unequivocal. It would be that it is manifestly a manipulation and abuse of the principles of secularism to provide a justification for imperialism. The 1916 Rising, regardless of the religious affiliations of its leaders or the wording of its Proclamation was not fundamentally about religion at all but about national liberation. It was not about Catholicism versus Protestantism but about whether or not Britain should rule Ireland. And that therefore all socialists (and all democrats and progressives), as opponents of imperialism and defenders of the rights of oppressed nations to self determination, should stand unconditionally on the side of Irish freedom and with the Rising.

From this point of view whether or not the majority of the Irish, or the British for that matter, were Catholics, Protestants, Hindus or Jews was an entirely secondary matter and in no way the determining factor in the conflict. As to whether the ensuing independent Ireland would be reactionary, oppressive to women and so on that would be determined primarily not by the religious ideas in the heads of Padraig Pearse or the other signatories but by which social class emerged from the struggle for independence as the class in the saddle. If the working class and its leaders such as Connolly, Markievicz, and Lynn had come out on top then Ireland would have take its place alongside revolutionary Russia in the vanguard of the struggle for sexual equality and women’s liberation.


Fast forward to the Troubles and the imagined dialogue above reappears with a vengeance in the British media. The conflict between predominantly Protestant Unionism and predominantly Catholic Nationalism is depicted as primarily a religious conflict with the idea that the conflict is about religion being seen as evidence of Irish stupidity and backwardness. After all hadn’t people in ‘civilised’ Britain stopped fighting about religion in the 18th century? Moreover the role of the British state in this conflict was to stand outside and above the two irrational warring tribes and mediate between them, while isolating and defeating the evil terrorists (the IRA).


The term ‘secularism’ is not much used but popular hostility to religion and especially religious fanaticism (in Britain) is skilfully harnessed to mask the obvious fact that this conflict is not at all about the doctrine of transubstantiation or the infallibility of the Pope but about whether Northern Ireland should be ruled by Britain or be part of the Irish Republic and that in turn is fuelled by systematic social, economic and political discrimination against the Nationalist community. And while this is obscuring the real nature of the conflict it is simultaneously legitimating the role of the British army which is actually acting to sustain the sectarian state and British rule.

Today, however, although the issues of oppression and British rule have not gone away the fact that the war has ended and that Sinn Fein is in government with the DUP means that questions related to secularism like marriage equality, LGBT+ rights and a woman’s right to choose come more to the fore.

What these examples show is that although secularism is a goal which socialists support the banner of secularism can be used to serve a number of purposes, reactionary as well as progressive. Therefore it is necessary always to make a concrete assessment of the concrete situation to determine the role being played by this slogan. How does it relate in the given historical circumstances to the interests of the working class and the struggle against oppression?

French secularism in perspective.

Secularism has a long and complex history. Its origins in Europe stretch back to the beginnings of the scientific revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when Copernicus and Galileo took on the Church and ‘the spiritual dictatorship of the Church was shattered’ [1] Elements of it can be seen in the Dutch Revolt of 1565 – 1600 when religious tolerance was established in the Dutch Republic in order to unite the Dutch people against Habsburg Empire based in Counter reformation Spain. It develops further among the philosophers of the eighteenth century enlightenment (Diderot, Voltaire etc) and comes into its own with the French Revolution of 1789-94

In August 1789, shortly after the Storming of the Bastille, the Revolution abolished the privileges of the First (the clergy) and Second (Nobility) Estates and abolished the tithes gathered by the Church. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 proclaimed freedom of religion throughout France. On October 10 the National Constituent Assembly seized the properties and land held by the Catholic Church and sold them off at public auctions. In 1790 the Assembly formally subordinated the Roman Catholic Church in France to the French government and in September 1792 divorce was legalised and the State took control of the birth, death, and marriage registers away from the Church.  In 1791, Jews were emancipated—receiving  full civic rights as individuals but, significantly, none as a group. At the height of the Revolution during the Jacobin period (1792-94) there was an active campaign of dechristianisation in which religious statues and icons were destroyed and an attempt was made to launch a kind of substitute religion in the form of a ‘Cult of Reason’. There were also riots in which priests were massacred.
It is should be noted that secularism also featured in the American Revolution with Thomas Jefferson writing into the American constitution the amendment that ‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof’ as a result of which the US has no established or state religion to this day.
In contrast to the US the reaction that followed the French Revolution and rise to power of Napoleon with his restoration of the Empire also brought with it the restoration of the Church. However secularism lived on as a republican ideal throughout the nineteenth century and was also adopted by the working class and socialist movement. In the Paris Commune of 1871 one of its first decrees separated the church from the state, appropriated all church property to public property, and excluded the practice of religion from schools. In theory, the churches were allowed to continue their religious activity only if they kept their doors open for public political meetings during the evenings but this seems not to have been implemented.
The Commune, of course, was crushed after only 74 days but in 1881-2  France established a mandatory, free and secular education system that relied on state-paid professional teachers rather than on Catholic clerics. And in 1905 a new law was passed on the separation of church and state which remains the legal foundation of French secularity (laicité).
What is evident from this brief overview is that  the struggle for secularism – in the scientific revolution, the Dutch Republic, the enlightenment and the French and American Revolutions – was an integral part of the rise of the bourgeoisie and the bourgeois democratic revolutions against feudalism. It was directed, first and foremost, against the Catholic Church which economically, politically and ideologically was the principle ally of the feudal aristocracy, absolute monarchy and feudal reaction as a whole. The consistently reactionary and counter revolutionary role  of the Catholic Church from the days of the Medicis, through to 1789 and 1848 and the Spanish Civil War, also turned the European workers’ movement against it. In this respect secularism, like the bourgeois democratic revolutions of which it was a part was thoroughly progressive.
But this is not the end of the story. If the bourgeois revolutions against feudalism were progressive it also the case that, from the moment of its conquest of political power, the bourgeoisie embarked on a policy of colonial conquest and enslavement of the rest of the world. Thus the Dutch Republic, within a decade of winning its independence from the Habsburg empire in what was perhaps the first war of national liberation, and becoming the most progressive society in Europe at the time, had established a colonial empire which stretched from Batavia (today’s Indonesia) in the far east to New Amsterdam (New York) and Pernambuco (Brasil) in the Americas, which they naturally ran with great brutality. Similarly the bourgeois revolutionary Oliver Cromwell, had no sooner cut off the head of Charles I in January 1649 than he embarked in August of the same year on the conquest of Ireland with consequences that remain legendary. Bourgeois Britain then went on to establish the global empire on which the sun never set and the blood never dried.
France’s war of revolutionary defence in 1793, turned with Napoleon into a war of conquest, whose oppressive ferocity was shockingly recorded by Goya in his Disasters of War, while at the same time he invaded Egypt and Syria and attempted to restore slavery in Haiti. In 1830 France decided to ‘share its culture’[2] with Algeria by invading it in a war of conquest that by 1870 had reduced the Algerian population by one third. This was the beginning of the extensive French empire in Africa, second only to Britain’s, that stretched across the Maghreb to Morocco and down to Senegal, Mali, Congo, Madagascar and elsewhere along with colonies in Indo-China (Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia), New Caledonia in the Pacific, and in the Caribbean. This was an empire which lasted until after Second World War and came to an end only with being driven out of Vietnam by the Viet Minh in 1954 and the horrendously ferocious Algerian War of 1954-62.
As the British Empire was depicted as ‘the White Man’s Burden’ so the French colonial project was presented as a ‘civilising mission’ (mission civilisatrice) bringing civilisation to backward and benighted peoples, and in this context the meaning of secularism changed profoundly. From being a progressive value directed against oppression it became seen as a marker of national pride and superiority which could be used to justify colonialism and all the oppression it entailed.
During the post Second World War economic boom, ‘les trente glorieuses’ as it was known in France, there was large scale immigration from North Africa as workers were sucked in to meet labour shortages in the expanding economy. It was a process very similar to what occurred in Britain during the same period, with the migrant workers in both cases being drawn from the former colonies[3]. In France this inevitably meant that a high proportion of these immigrants were Muslim[4]. And in this situation ‘secularism’ became a slogan behind which racists and racist organisations could mobilise anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim sentiment.
In itself there was nothing uniquely French to this. The British far right have tried repeatedly to make things like halal meat and the building of mosques a pretext for racist campaigns and the notion that immigrants should ‘conform to our values’ whatever they might be, is doubtless a seam mined by racists everywhere. Nevertheless the specificities of French history made the notion of ‘secularism’ well suited for this purpose. What made it particularly effective was that it invoked what had been a progressive tradition and this gave it a purchase among French liberals and sections of the French left, including sadly some of the far left, that ‘British values’ never had with the British left.
Thus, when in the late eighties the wearing the hijab or headscarf by school students became an issue, left wing teachers[5] were among those making the running in the call for a ban and in the nineties there were actually some teachers’ strikes over this question- not something which, to my knowledge, has occurred in other countries.
The ‘progressive’ credentials of secularism were further augmented by throwing feminism into the mix. In relation to the hijab and other forms of the Islamic veil (niqab, chador, burka etc) the argument was made that this was a marker of women’s oppression imposed on Muslim women by their patriarchal families and their backward misogynistic religion. It was therefore a blow for women’s liberation to ban the hijab etc from public institutions.
This argument, not confined to France but particularly potent in France, rested on several errors. First it was based on a one-dimensional and stereotyped view of the hijab which refused to listen to what many Muslim women themselves were saying on the issue. Yes, historically the veiling of women was linked to the oppression of women but in the world today it is also linked to Muslim identity (in the way that the ‘Afro’ hairstyle was linked to Black identity in the sixties) and therefore is often adopted by Muslim women voluntarily and as a statement of defiance and pride in their identity in the face of racism and exclusion. Second, it was based on a patronising top down conception of emancipation in which the liberation of Muslim women was to be handed to them from above rather than taken by those women themselves. Third, it violated the very simple democratic principle that people should be allowed to wear what they want and, indeed, that there should be freedom of religious expression. Fourth, it lined up progressive feminism in common cause with the growing forces of the racist and fascist right, especially the Front National. Fifth, it chimed with a wider deployment of the feminist card by the US state and others (the likes of Hilary Clinton) to justify imperialist interventions and wars. ‘We should invade Afghanistan to liberate Afghan women from the Taliban!’.
Unfortunately the extreme cynicism and hypocrisy of this last point - the United States has never invaded anywhere to liberate women, or men for that matter, but only and exclusively in pursuit of its economic and strategic interests – has not prevented it having a certain effect. And this effect has been particularly pernicious because the invocation of the radical values of secularism and feminism has worked to variously co-opt, confuse and demobilise precisely those progressive, left and socialist forces who should have been at the forefront of resisting the rise of racism and fascism in France which, tragically, have been given a relatively easy ride.
However all of this has reached the peak it has because it has coincided with a phenomenon that is by neither peculiar to France nor French in origin – the global rise of Islamophobia.
The Rise of Islamophobia
White western Europeans[6] have viewed non- Europeans and people of colour with a combination of hostility and contempt for approximately five hundred years – that is since Europe began the process of conquering and enslaving most of the rest of the world. This means that in the larger scheme of things, as Alex Callinicos has remarked, ‘Racism is a historical novelty’[7] but half a millennium is nonetheless a long time in the development of our social consciousness. By comparison Islamophobia is of really recent origin. I am looking at a 1980 edition of the Concise Oxford English Dictionary – it does not contain the word ‘Islamophobia’[8] A standard sociological textbook from 1990, E.Cashmore and B.Troyna, Introduction to Race Relations, does not discuss the phenomenon and has no reference to the word in its index, nor does Alex Callinicos’ Race and Class from 1993.Of course, the people who are now subject to Islamophobia have long been the objects of racism, but it was on the basis of their skin colour, nationality, ethnicity (so-called ‘race’) and alleged culture, not their adherence to Islam or their Muslim identity. They were seen and labelled as ‘Arabs’ or ‘Pakis’ or ‘Asians’ or ‘wogs’ or ‘blacks’ etc. not as Muslims.
So when, how and why – the questions are interconnected – did Islamophobia develop? A commonplace view is that it emerged as a response to 9/11 and an accompaniment to Bush’s ‘war on terror’. Obviously these were an important turning point and marked a definite escalation but they were not the origin. Samuel P. Huntington’s book The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order was the key founding intellectual text of Islamophobia. It was published in 1996 and was the working up of an article written in 1993 and a lecture given in 1992. In the 1993 essay he wrote:
The most important conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural fault lines separating these civilizations from one another. Why will this be the case? First, differences among civilizations are not only real; they are basic. Civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most important, religion…
These differences are the product of centuries. They will not soon disappear. They are far more fundamental than differences among political ideologies and political regimes.[9]
This then gives us an indication as to when and how Islamophobia began to gain momentum. It was in the early to mid-nineties. I do not mean by this that Huntingdon through his essay or his book started the phenomenon or is responsible for it. Huntington was, in the words of Tariq Ali, a ‘state intellectual’[10]. He was director of Harvard's Centre for International Affairs and the White House Coordinator of Security Planning under Jimmy Carter. This means that his ‘theories’ were from the outset fashioned to meet the needs of the US ruling class and, in so far as they were taken up and propagated it was because that class and its representatives in the White House, the Pentagon and then the media deemed useful.
This particular theory was then seized upon and disseminated with great vigour and with ever growing intensity after 9/11. Such is the global hegemony of the US bourgeoisie in these matters and also the confluence of material interests of British, French and European imperialism, that the notion of Islam and Muslims as a threat to our way of life was soon appearing not only from the mouths of leading political figures but also, at least by innuendo and implication, in the headlines of innumerable newspapers and TV news broadcasts around the world, until within a matter of years it had become almost ‘common sense’.
But if that is when and how, what about why?  The two main background factors were the Iranian Revolution of 1979 with its Islamist outcome and the collapse of Communism and end of the cold war in 1989-91. The Iranian Revolution overthrew the Shah of Iran who, together with his regime, was a key US ally in the Middle East and possessed major oil reserves. The Islamist regime of Ayatollah Khomeini which emerged from the Revolution then gave a huge impetus to Islamist movements throughout the region. The appeal of Islamism, or political Islam, across the Middle East was aided by the complete failure of nationalism and communism (Stalinism), which had previously been the predominant forces, to successfully challenge imperialism in the area. During the Cold War the West had tended to view the Islamists with indulgence as potential or actual allies in the fight against the godless communists, as in US support for forerunners of the Taliban against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. But with the Cold War over and the communist threat eliminated US imperialism increasingly saw Islamism as the main threat to its interests, above all in the oil rich Middle East.
Noting the fact that the Islamophobic drive began before 9/11 is important because it is often presented as emerging as a response to 9/11. In reality the rise of Islamophobia was, along with US imperialism’s general record in the Middle East, one of the causes of the attack on the Twin Towers. However it is clear that 9/11 and the subsequent ‘war on terror’ with its invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq ratcheted up the whole vicious cycle of war, terrorist atrocity, more war, more terror and ever more racism and hatred.
Some observations about how racism works: first, once a group is stigmatised and demonised by official society they become a target for all sorts of bigots and bullies. These range from the bully in playground looking for a child to intimidate to fascist and Nazi parties trying to build on the basis of hatred. For fascists the ultimate enemy is the working class movement and socialism but they will use any scapegoat going to help them attract support to defeat the working class and the left; it can be Jews, asylum seekers, Poles, blacks, Roma – whoever is being singled out by the media and the establishment. Once the media identified ‘Muslims’ as ‘the problem’ every fascist, big or small, leapt on the band wagon even to the point, in many cases, of becoming pro-Israel.
Second, when a racist band wagon is rolling it becomes a case of ‘any stick to beat a dog’ – drag in any argument that lays to hand, especially those you can use to wrong foot or embarrass ideological or political opponents. Thus, for example, inserted into the discourse of Islamophobia, is the claim that a marker of Muslims ‘not sharing our  values’ is Muslim homophobia. This notion is promoted with a straight face as if belief in LGBT+ equality were a ‘traditional’ Western value by people who a decade or two ago would most likely have been grubby homophobes. And in this toxic context using secularism (with a dash of misogyny parading as feminism) as a weapon to further estrange and isolate Muslims was an obvious move.
Two Coups
The issue of the abuse of secularism as a pitfall which can seriously derail the left and serve reaction is not confined to France or Europe. On the contrary it has played a significant role in two recent major events in the Middle East: the Egyptian military coup of July 2013 and the attempted military coup in Turkey in July 2016.
To understand how this worked it is necessary first to dispel a false Islamophobic view of the Middle East as one vast Muslim Islamist mass. Of course it is true that the overwhelming majority of people in the Middle East, including Turkey, and across North Africa are Muslim by faith, much as the overwhelming majority of Irish were (until very recently) Catholic. Nevertheless there were in the 20th century and across the region large secularist and modernising political movements of various kinds. This secularist spectrum ranged from right wing bourgeois movements and regimes that acted as agents of or collaborators with, imperialism, through bourgeois nationalist movements and regimes that were to some degree anti-imperialist to the Communist/Stalinist left. Examples, moving round the Mediterranean, would include the Algerian FLN (National Liberation Front), Nasser and Nasserism in Egypt, the PLO in Palestine, the Ba’ath Party in Syria and Iraq, Mohammed Mosaddegh (PM of Iran till overthrown by CIA coup in 1953), the various Kurdish parties such as the PKK in Turkish Kurdistan, Kemal Ataturk and Kemalist parties in Turkey and the Communist Parties of Egypt, Sudan, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey.
The picture is complicated by the fact that these categories were fluid and the labels often misleading. Thus, a movement e.g. Kemalism, could begin as to some extent anti-imperialist and morph into a pro- imperialist force; a bourgeois nationalist movement e.g. the Ba’ath Party of Saddam Hussein (and that of the Assad family), could describe itself as socialist and include socialist in its official name, without harbouring  the slightest intention of opposing capitalism or liberating the working class[11] and the Communists were quite often largely middle class in terms of their entire leading layers and pursued a policy of subordinating themselves to bourgeois nationalists such as Nasser.[12] But what all these forces had in common was a desire to ‘modernise’ their respective nations and a perception of the Muslim masses, both peasants and workers, as a ‘backward’ obstacle to this process. This elitism towards the mass of ordinary people sank deep roots in large sections of the region’s ‘left’ and ‘progressive’ forces.[13]
One effect of this approach was to isolate much of the left from the religious masses and consequently make it easier for the Islamists, such as the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt or Erdogan’s AKP (Justice and Development Party) in Turkey, to present themselves as the principle opposition to the pro-imperialist regimes and pro-Western military. However where this particular chicken really came home to roost was with General Al-Sisi’s military coup of 3 July 2013.
Because the Muslim Brotherhood were seen by the Egyptian masses as the main opposition to the hated regime of Hosni Mubarak the victory of the anti-Mubarak revolution in early 2011 and the holding of Egypt’s first real elections produced a Muslim Brotherhood government and Muslim Brotherhood President, Mohammed Morsi. But this government, behaving rather like the Irish Labour Party and other right wing reformist parties, collaborated with the military, with the state and with Egyptian capitalism and did nothing at all for the mass of the people who had elected them. Indeed for the majority of Egyptians things got worse as the economy deteriorated and state institutions became increasingly dysfunctional. This in turn produced a mass movement against the government which culminated in vast anti-MB demonstrations on 30 June.
At this point, and it was clearly planned in advance (perhaps with the aid of the CIA), the military were able to take advantage of the mass discontent and stage their coup. When the Muslim Brotherhood protested against the coup in the name of democratic legitimacy and organised sit-ins at al-Nahda Square and Rabaa al-Adawiya Square. The military responded on August 14 with a deadly massacre at Rabaa which claimed, in a few hours, somewhere between 800 and 2000 lives. Human Rights Watch called it, ‘one of the world’s largest killings of demonstrators in a single day in recent history’[14] On the basis of this the Al-Sisi regime was able to consolidate its thoroughgoing counterrevolution and re-establish all the features of the Mubarak dictatorship.
The tragedy was that many political forces and individuals who had played leading roles in the Egyptian Revolution of 2011 now supported the anti-Muslim Brotherhood coup on the grounds that the military were a lesser evil than the Islamists. Perhaps the worst case of this was Hamdeen Sabahi, the Nasserist leader who was jailed seventeen times under Mubarak and who had stood as a semi-left candidate in the 2012 Presidential election, coming third with 21% of the vote. The April 6 Youth Movement, who were a major factor in the street mobilizations in 2011, also gave partial support to the coup.[15] As a result there was very little effective resistance to the counter revolutionary coup.
At the heart of this failure was the widespread tendency to see the fundamental division in society as ‘modern’ secularism versus ‘backward’ Islamism, rather than the class struggle and hence to regard the Muslim Brotherhood, not the military, as the main enemy.
Another position taken by many on the Egyptian left is that of the Third Square[16] which rejects the army and the Brotherhood as both equally reactionary, both equal poles of counterrevolution.[17] But this, though clearly preferable to Sabahi’s out right support for the coup, is still inadequate. To treat two political forces as equal poles of counterrevolution when one is in power and massacring and imprisoning the other and when one is the main representative of the ruling class and the embodiment of the capitalist state and the other is a predominantly petty bourgeois opposition with a mass base among the poor is, intentionally or not, to give aid to the oppressor. Instead, in order effectively to build resistance to the al-Sisi dictatorship it is necessary for socialists to defend all those suffering repression, regardless of their religion and including the Muslim Brotherhood. [18]
The attempted coup in Turkey on 15 July raised similar issues though the outcome was very different. The similarity lay in the fact that many forces on the left, in Turkey and internationally, were reluctant to wholeheartedly or actively oppose the coup because they thought that the Islamist Erdogan government was as bad as (or perhaps worse than) rule by the secular military . The whole event was over in a matter of hours so there was little time for parties and movements (still less academics) to take formal positions, nevertheless the phenomenon I refer to was evident in terms of who did not come out onto the streets and in the commentary on social media. Anyone on that night who posted clear anti-coup statements was immediately assailed by objections from many sides including people of ‘the left’. And this was despite the fact that the Turkish military had form – that two previous coups in 1960 and 1980 had been brutal and repressive in the extreme.
One argument put forward to justify failure to oppose the coup is that it was a ‘fake coup’ staged by Erdogan himself to strengthen his position. Given the seriousness of what occurred that night, the bombing of parliament and the presidential place and the more than two hundred people killed this can be dismissed as fanciful but the reason for the ‘theory’ (and the fact that it was advanced by many people with very scant knowledge of Turkey) was clearly that it got people off the hook of having actually to oppose it.
Another argument was the notion that Erdogan was/is a fascist. This had been popular, including in certain anarchist/autonomist circles, at the time of Gezi Park and it resurfaced in relation to the coup. This characterisation is false for many reasons. It is an instance of the tendency to call all instances of capitalist state repression fascist, as in Thatcher was a fascist, Donald Trump is a fascist and so on. In reality fascism was and is a counterrevolutionary mass movement that destroys bourgeois democracy and the working class movement (the trade unions and all the left) - destroys and eliminates not attacks and weakens. This is the basic distinction between Mussolini, Hitler, Jobbyk, Golden Dawn and the Front National on the one hand and Thatcher, Trump, Bush, UKIP, Cameron, Merkel etc on the other. Erdogan and his government do not meet these criteria at all. In addition calling the AKP fascist has affinities with the Islamophobic term ‘Islamo-fascism’ used by former leftists like Christopher Hitchens and Nick Cohen to justify their support for George Bush and Tony Blair.
The third and superficially most plausible argument for not opposing the military coup is that Erdogan has been able to use his victory to reinforce his own power and to extend that power in an increasingly authoritarian direction. There is no doubt that this has happened and that the crackdown against those responsible for coup, the so-called Gulenists and putchist elements in the Military, has extended way beyond the ranks of those who could have been involved: Erdogan’s Justice Minister Bekir Bozdag has himself stated that the number of arrests has reached 32,000.[19] Nevertheless this argument is false for two reasons: first because in terms of scale and severity this does not compare with the repression meted out by the military. According to The Economist, ‘Turkey’s army has overthrown no fewer than four governments since 1960. The bloodiest coup came in 1980, when 50 people were executed, 500,000 were arrested and many hundreds died in jail’[20] Second because progressive and left wing forces would be in a much stronger position to resist this anti-democratic authoritarianism in so far as they clearly opposed the coup from the word go.
Why then was the Turkish coup unsuccessful, while the Egyptian coup swept all before it? Partly because the Turkish army was not united but mainly because the Turkish masses, primarily the Turkish working class, came out onto the streets in huge numbers immediately, on the night of 15 July, to confront the tanks and stop the coup in its tracks. They did this at the call of Erdogan (though not all who came out were AKP supporters.. But the reason has little to do with religion and everything to do with economics. In Egypt the capitalist economy was deteriorating and so Egyptian Islamism bitterly disappointed many of its supporters. In Turkey the capitalist economy experienced an unprecedented boom and this enabled Erdogan, by means of limited but judicious reforms, to retain and increase its base in the working class. If we want an Irish parallel we could say Erdogan’s AKP resembled Fianna Fail in the Celtic Tiger whereas the Muslim Brotherhood was like Fianna Fail after the crash of 2008.
What both these cases demonstrate is the folly of seeing secularism versus theocracy as the main dividing line in society rather than the politics of class conflict.
Marxism and Religion
This article as a whole should be understood as an application to contemporary events of the basic Marxist analysis of religion which in turn is part of the general historical materialist theory of ideology. This is not the place for an exposition of this underlying theory[21]. However, two points need to be made here by way of conclusion.
The first is simply that people make religions not religions people. Religion as a whole and every religion in particular is a social product, a response to a real set of material circumstances and therefore as society changes, as material conditions change so do religions and people’s interpretations of religious texts and doctrines. This applies equally to Christianity, Islam, Judaism and all the rest. As Chris Harman has said:
The confusion often starts with a confusion about the power of religion itself. Religious people see it as a historical force in its own right, whether for good or for evil. So too do most bourgeois anti-clerical and free thinkers. For them, fighting the influence of religious institutions and obscurantist ideas is in itself the way to human liberation.
But although religious institutions and ideas clearly play a role in history, this does not happen in separation from the rest of material reality. Religious institutions, with their layers of priests and teachers, arise in a certain society and interact with that society[22].
The second is that in determining the socialist and Marxist response to political movements with a religious colouration – of which there are a multitude – the starting point is not the theology or doctrine of the movement but the social force or forces it represents and its role in the class struggle. This is the criterion Marxists have generally applied to movements with a Christian ideology from Martin Luther King and the Civil Rights Movement to the right wing Moral Majority to the Easter Rising and the IRA and Chavez in Venezuela. It is the criterion that must be applied to Islamist movements in their equally great variety. Hamas and Hezbollah, Al Qaeda and Isis, the Muslim Brotherhood and the AKP cannot all be lumped together in one Islamist pot. It is necessary to make a concrete analysis of each in its specific circumstances. And exactly the same principle applies to secularism.




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[1] F.Engels, ‘Introduction to the Dialectics of Nature’, Marx/Engels, Selected Works, Vol.II,  Moscow 1962, p.63.
[2] September 8 2016, the former French Prime Minister and future presidential candidate, François Fillon, said that France is not guilty because it only wanted to share its culture with its former colonies.
[3] Ireland, of course, does not have former colonies and did not experience anything comparable to the western European boom of the fifties and sixties. The parallel here would be what happened in the Celtic Tiger.
[4] The French census does not record people by religion and estimates for the number of Muslims currently in France vary considerably. A recent report from the Interior Ministry puts the figure at 4.15 million (around 6.2%) compared to 2.7 million in Britain (around 4.5%).
[5] Unfortunately a particularly shameful role was played in this regard by members of Lutte Ouvriere, one of the main French Trotskyist organisations. See ‘The Islamic veil and the subjugation of women’,   http://journal.lutte-ouvriere.org/2003/04/24/foulard-islamique-et-soumission-des-femmes_6495.html
and Chris Harman ‘Behind the Veil’, Socialist Review 180, Nov. 1994. https://www.marxists.org/archive/harman/1994/11/veil.htm

[6]  I am referring here to the attitudes of dominant social groups and the dominant ideology, not to all Europeans.
[7] Alex Callinicos, Race and Class, London 1993, p.16
[8] The longer Oxford English Dictionary contains a reference to the use of the word in 1923 but this was clearly a completely isolated example.
[10] ‘State intellectuals are those who have worker for and emerged from the bowels of the US state machine: Kissinger, Brzezinski, Fukuyama and Huntington typify this breed’. Tariq Ali, The Clash of Fundamentalisms, London 2002, p.302
[11] This was particularly the case in the era when adopting the label socialist facilitated receiving aid and or protection from the Soviet Union.
[12] This policy derived from the ‘stages’ theory adopted by Stalin and the Comintern in the mid-1920s and the Popular Front strategy of the 1930s.  For an account of the relation between ‘Communism’ and third world nationalism see John Molyneux, What is the Real Marxist Tradition?, London 1985. See https://www.marxists.org/history/etol/writers/molyneux/1983/07/tradition.htm

[13]  For a discussion of these attitudes in relation to the Turkish working class see Ron Margulies, ‘What are we to do with Islam? The case of Turkey’, International Socialism 151. http://isj.org.uk/what-are-we-to-do-with-islam/

[15] To their credit they later withdrew this but by then the worst damage had been done.
[17] This position has also been theorised internationally by Gilbert Achcar  (SOAS Professor and member of the New Anti-Capitalist Party in France) in his book  Morbid Symptoms: Relapse in the Arab Uprising, London 2016.
[18] For much fuller analyses of the Egyptian Revolution and its fate see John Molyneux, ‘Lessons from the Egyptian Revolution’ Irish Marxist Review 13, and  Philip Marfleet, Egypt:Contested Revolution, London 2016.
[21] For my take on these matters see John Molyneux, ‘More than opium: Marxism and religion,’ International Socialism 119. (2008) and John Molyneux, The Point is to Change it: an introduction to Marxist Philosophy, London 2011.
[22] Chris Harman, ‘The Prophet and the Proletariat’, International Socialism 64 (1994) p,4-5. https://www.marxists.org/archive/harman/1994/xx/islam.htm
It should be said that this outstanding and pioneering article paved the way for many of the arguments presented here.

Sunday, September 11, 2016

Art in the face of Barbarism


Stuff Happens: Art in the face of barbarism

John Molyneux

This was written as the forward to "Wars of Aggression", the catalogue for May Ayres' current exhibition at the Belfry, St.Jon on Bethnal Green, London.

I first encountered May Ayres and her work when I visited her studio in East London in 2007. I was struck instantly by the power of her art – and, equally instantly, formed a warm regard for her as a person.

The main theme of her sculpture was war and the pity of war and in particular the Iraq War of 2003-4. At that time the Iraq War was fresh in all our minds as was the mass people’s movement that had tried in vain to prevent it. What I especially recall from that period are two large and stunning statues which so effectively expressed everything that was wrong with that horrible war. The first, entitled Pro-Consul, was a devastating portrayal of John Negroponte who, having previously overseen death squads for Ronald Reagan in Central America, became US Ambassador to Iraq in 2004. What this work conveyed with exceptional clarity and force was Ayres’ vision of this man as deeply corrupt – the embodiment of evil. The second, Fallujah, depicted a gun toting US soldier manhandling an Iraqi .So strong was this work, so powerfully did it express the brutality and horror that was inflicted on Fallujah in the infamous Operation Phantom Fury, that it completely dominated the ‘Left in Vision’ show of which it was a part.

Now, eight or so years later, May Ayres is still making sculptures about war and the pity of war and still responding to the Iraq War and its aftermath. It might be suggested that she should ‘move on’. But in response it should be said that the history of art yields many examples of artists who produced great work while and through focussing, seemingly obsessively, on a certain theme: Cezanne on Mont St.Victoire, Mondrian on grids with primary colours, Rembrandt on himself and so on. And in political terms we owe a considerable debt to people who refuse to “move on”. Without them would there ever have been justice for the victims of Bloody Sunday, for the Guildford Four or the Birmingham Six or the Hillsborough Families and so many others?

Moreover, the disastrous legacy of the Iraq War is still with us in the most immediate sense. Before the invasion of 2003 the Middle East was already a dangerous cocktail of conflict, tensions, bitterness, war and repression. This was due to a century or more of imperialist interventions and rivalries designed to maintain control of the world’s major oil supplies and sustain Western hegemony in this economically and strategically vital region. These ranged from the Balfour Agreement of 1917, the Sykes-Picot division of Arabia, the role of oil companies (especially BP), the establishment of the state of Israel at the expense of the Palestinians, the overthrow in a US engineered coup of the Mossadegh Government in Iran, the Suez adventure, the various Arab-Israeli wars, the support for Saddam Hussein in the Iraq-Iran War, the Gulf War of 1991, the support for Saudi Arabia, Mubarak in Egypt, Bahrein  and many other repressive regimes in the area, through to the invasion of Afghanistan.

But after the Iraq War all of these conflicts and tensions were raised to a new pitch of intensity. In addition to directly killing 100,000 people or more (estimates vary greatly) and destroying Iraqi society and infrastructure the War, which even in official US terms lasted until 2011, had the effect of stirring up and fuelling a wave of sectarian conflict that threatens to engulf the Middle East. Like any imperialist power occupying a subject nation the US feared a united national resistance and resorted to the age-old tactic of divide and rule. In Iraq this meant backing a corrupt and viciously sectarian Shia government. This, in turn, produced an equally sectarian Sunni backlash and out of this was born the horror of ISIL/Daesh and more war and killing that continues to this day in a vicious cycle of imperialist intervention, terrorist atrocity and Islamophobic backlash.

Moreover, although it is both abundantly clear and very widely recognised, that Britain was taken into the Iraq War (against the wishes of the people) on the basis of deliberate and calculated lying about ‘weapons of destruction’ by our government and its Prime Minister, Tony Blair, there has still not yet – at the time of writing – been any official recognition of this or restitution for it. As it happens between the writing of this Forward and the opening of this exhibition we will see the publication of the long awaited Chilcot Report. Is it too much to hope, therefore,  that May’s exhibition will coincide with  a) an  acknowledgement of  some of the truth of this shameful episode; b) recommendations of some kind of justice for these war crimes and this deception of the British people?

So how does May Ayres’ art respond to this history and this state of affairs? With an impassioned combination of deep human sympathy for the suffering involved and rage and indignation against the hypocrisy and callous inhumanity of the perpetrators. It is work that brings together the influence and legacy of Kathe Kollwitz and Georg Grosz.

The element of sympathy and solidarity with the suffering is most clearly represented in the moving Witness to Carnage and the unbearably sad Samar Hassan. (It is worth noting that May is close enough to this history to know the names and stories of people few others have heard of e.g. the rape victim Abeer Qassam al-Janabi). The element of indignation is strongest in the two awesome columns devoted to Condoleezza Rice and Theresa May.  But these columns, while brilliantly satirising Rice and May, also insistently make the point that these politicians stand literally on the bodies of their victims.

May informs me that she is working on a statue called Collateral Damage depicting an Iraqi mother holding aloft her dead child.. It will, she says, be over six feet tall and will convey that although ‘the children are victims’ the Iraqi people ‘against all odds, remain defiant’. At the time of writing I have not seen this piece but knowing Ayres’ work as I do I have little doubt that it will be immensely powerful. It is also strikes me that it will recapitulate and express Ayres’ whole artistic project: a defiant woman holds up the body of a dead child to its killers and to the world.


Finally I want to say that such is the political and emotional power of Ayres’ work that one can easily lose sight of the exceptional craft and artistry involved in its making. In fact without that artistry and the arduous intense labour it entails the great political effect would not be realised. It is, in its way, an heroic endeavour and achievement.

Tuesday, August 02, 2016

Towards a Revolutionary Party in Ireland

Towards a Revolutionary Party in Ireland

John Molyneux

This article first appeared in Irish Marxist Review 15

The water charges movement showed that working class communities didn’t need a revolutionary party to block water meters, to get out on the streets in their hundreds of thousands and to inflict a serious defeat on the government.

It is the same story in other countries. In Spain people didn’t need a party to occupy squares in their millions and in Egypt in 2011 they didn’t need a party to drive the police off the streets, defeat the counter-revolutionary baltagiya (hired thugs) and bring down a dictator. In France today no one needs a revolutionary party to mount mass strikes and street protests, take on the brutal CRS riot cops and hold exciting street debates.

Even if we accept the need for elected representatives to form a left government we still don’t need a revolutionary party. The experience of Syriza in Greece, of Sanders in the US, of Corbyn in Britain, of Podemos in Spain, and even of AAA-PBP and Independents4Change in Ireland might suggest that most people don’t want some kind of narrow revolutionary party; what they want is a broad united party of the left.

So why do we need to ‘build the revolutionary party’?

Three reasons

There are three main reasons why a revolutionary party must be built.

First, even in terms of an immediate struggle such as the anti-water charges movement having a revolutionary socialist party at its heart is a very positive thing – it helps the campaign to win.

A revolutionary party brings together activists from Clondalkin and Ballyfermot, Artane and Dun Laoghaire, Cork and Sligo, Wicklow and Wexford. It also involves people who fought the household charges and the bin tax and some who resisted water charges the first time around. In the party these activists can pool their experience and form a coherent strategy.

This was what happened and on that basis we argued that it was not enough just to resist meters – important as that was – but we needed mass demonstrations. And mass demos were not enough – we needed a mass boycott. But the mass boycott also needed masses on the streets to sustain it. And that resistance to meters and the demos and the boycott needed to be accompanied by a challenge at the ballot box.

And this strategy has been proven correct. But in fact each part of it was resisted at various times by elements in the movement. To win it we needed a coherent group of people – at the heart of the movement – patiently arguing for this strategy.

This is not just the case on water charges but applies to other issues. Take the Luas workers. Having a broad range of activists with experience of strikes and the trade unions means that we had people who, from the start, knew how to answer the media attacks on the Luas workers and who understood that a victory for the Luas workers would be a victory for all workers, and also grasped the importance of mobilising organised solidarity. Without a party the tendency would be just to sit back as individuals either cursing at the TV or worse being influenced by it.


Then again there is the question of the trade union leaders. Workers when they first go on strike often feel they have no choice but to trust their union leaders but workers in a revolutionary party will learn from the experience of others that union leaders shouldn’t be relied on. Trade union leaders and officials have a long history, not just in Ireland but internationally, of vacillation: of seeming to back workers struggles but then holding them back, letting them down and even completely selling them out. This derives not just from the personal weakness of individual leaders but from the objective social position of union bureaucracies as mediators between labour and capital. But you won’t learn about this in school or college and RTE is certainly not going to tell you. Nor will you hear about it from broad reformist parties, not even left reformist parties, which are almost always linked to, and dependent on, the left wing of the trade union bureaucracy. Only a revolutionary party is going to highlight this vital issue for workers in struggle.[1]

The question of refugees and racism is another example. Even good activists in the water charges movement or militant trade unionists - even if they are instinctively anti- racist (as most are) – won’t necessarily know how to answer the arguments about foreigners taking our jobs or ‘shouldn’t we look after our own first’. And even people who are sympathetic to refugees may find it hard to deal with media flak that follows something like the Paris atrocities. Again a revolutionary party that brings people together and responds collectively and has people who know the facts, the history and the arguments greatly strengthens all involved and the anti-racist cause as a whole.

Second, there is the fact that forming a left government is, in itself, not enough. Any such government will face concerted resistance from the ruling class i.e. the 1%, and this resistance can lead to the left government being blocked, undermined, corrupted or destroyed. This has been proven again and again from what happened in Chile in 1970-73, when the Popular Unity government led by Salvador Allende was crushed by a military coup which killed thousands of Chileans, to numerous Labour governments in Britain, to the recent experience of Syriza in Greece.

It is not the case that knowledge of these events will be held, or pop spontaneously into the heads of water charges campaigners or working class people who join some other mass revolt in the future. Certainly the media won’t tell them. So again there needs to be a body of socialists within any movement for a left government who act as the memory of the working class and understand the need not to rely on any left government and to go further i.e. to move towards revolution and the smashing of the capitalist state.[2] Without that revolutionary spine the movement, even if it establishes a left government, will be derailed.

Third, if we accept the need for a revolution, then we also have to understand that although revolutions generally begin spontaneously, without the leadership of a revolutionary party, they don’t end that way, or rather they don’t end in victory.

The Irish Revolution of 1919 -23 is a good example of this. The Irish working class did magnificent things in those years with its general strikes, its factory occupations and ‘soviets’ and its defeat of the forces of the British Empire, but the fact that it had no revolutionary party of its own made it vulnerable to the politics of nationalism (both that of Collins and that of De Valera) and the weak compromisers of the Irish Labour Party and Trade Unions.  This allowed the counter-revolution to triumph and betray what the rebels of 1916 had fought for and establish a conservative capitalist state which, in its essentials, has remained intact until today.[3]

More recently the experience of the great Egyptian Revolution in 2011 showed the same problem. What the Egyptian masses achieved in 18 days of revolt – bringing down one the strongest regimes in the Middle East – was extraordinary. But having done that the political experience, clarity and cohesion of those masses was not enough to enable them to deal with the betrayal of the revolution by the Muslim Brotherhood and its repression by the Military in 2013.

There were organised revolutionary Marxists in Egypt in 2011 – the Egyptian Revolutionary Socialists. They were a splendid organisation who had shown great bravery in the struggle against Mubarak and had very good politics but they were too small (a couple of thousand in a country of 80 million) to shape events when many millions were on the streets as there were on the decisive day of the 30 June 2013.[4] As a result the Egyptian military were able to manipulate popular discontent with the Muslim Brotherhood government to carry out a brutal coup with a large measure of popular support. If the Revolutionary Socialists had been much stronger they could have channelled that popular anger in a progressive and left wing direction.

This need for a revolutionary party seriously rooted in the working class is not just proved by the Irish and Egyptian Revolutions but by the whole history of the working class and the revolutionary movement in the 20th and 21st centuries. Time and again working people have risen up against the system and time and again the revolution has been beaten back. This is what happened in Italy 1919-20, in Germany 1919-23, Spain 1936, France 1968, Portugal 1974, and many other examples.

The case of May ’68 in Paris is very instructive. A mass revolt of French students led to large scale fighting with the police especially on the legendary ‘night of the barricades’ in the Latin Quarter of Paris on 10 May. The extremely brutal response of the riot police and the heroism of the students inspired a general strike in protest and solidarity by the French working class. Originally intended as a one-day ‘demonstration’ strike by the unions it turned rapidly into an unlimited all-out general strike accompanied by numerous factory occupations. More than 10 million workers took part, including even the dancers at the Folies Bergere, and the whole society was paralysed. 
At this time revolutionary ideas of all sorts – anarchist, Trotskyist, spontanist, Maoist etc – were widely circulating amongst the students but the workers’ movement and the trade unions were dominated by the Stalinist and very reformist and conservative Communist Party (PCF) The PCF was hostile to the student revolt from the start and only reluctantly called – through the unions it controlled – the general strike which it sought to limit and restrain. In the student milieu there were a number of small revolutionary socialist ‘groupuscules’ – proto revolutionary parties – but they had no base in the working class.

The strategy of the PCF, which was a mass party, was to use its apparatus to keep the workers and students apart and thus prevent the workers being infected by revolutionary ideas. They did this by sending the students away when they turned up at the gates of occupied factories and by using trade union stewards to cordon off the student and worker contingents on the mass demonstrations. At the same time they worked to demobilise the factory occupations by sending the rank-and- file home and leaving the workplaces in the hands of union officials. Then factory by factory, sector by sector, they negotiated a return to work on the basis of limited economic concessions from the employers and a great opportunity to move towards the transformation of society was thrown away.

The key problem was the absence of a revolutionary party with roots among both the students and the workers which would have been able to combat the strategy of the PCF, above all from within the workplaces.

 Only in Russia in 1917 was a serious and experienced revolutionary party, the Bolshevik Party, in place and only in Russia was the working class able to take power.

The absence of trained revolutionary parties and correct revolutionary leadership, elsewhere in Europe in the revolutionary wave that followed the First World War (of which the Irish Revolution was a part) meant the defeat of that wave. That meant not only the survival of capitalism but the isolation of the Russian Revolution and the consequent rise of Stalinism and the victory of fascism in Italy, Germany and Spain.

The reason a revolutionary party is so essential is that even in a revolutionary situation in which the masses are on the streets and occupying their workplaces their consciousness will still be very uneven. While there will be many that are thoroughly revolutionary, there will be others that are still influenced by reformist and even reactionary ideas. In Ireland, because of its anti-imperialist and republican tradition, it is likely that nationalism will play a significant role. Moreover there will be some who, through inexperience, are ultraleft and want to storm the Dáil and take power immediately without a serious assessment of the chances of success.

In a revolutionary situation this will matter enormously. As we have already noted, In the Irish Revolution of 1919-23 a combination of nationalism – the idea of a common ‘national interest’ uniting the nation – and Labour Party reformism was able to persuade workers that ‘Labour must wait’ until after Irish independence was won: they are still waiting! In the Egyptian Revolution nationalism, a legacy of the anti-imperialist figure President Nasser who nationalised the Suez Canal, played a significant role in persuading the masses to back the military coup against the Muslim Brotherhood.[5]

Similarly in Egypt youthful and impatient ultraleftism which had played a magnificent role in the street fighting in the first eighteen days became a problem. For them the revolution consisted ONLY of going to Tahrir Square and fighting the police; they did not understand the need for strategy and tactics, for patient work to win over the majority of the workers and peasants in the workplaces and the villages.

It is not difficult to see how such problems could arise in a future revolutionary situation in Ireland. Nationalist and republican ideas, which also have an influence in the Irish trade union movement, could be traded on to win support for some kind of Sinn Fein- Fianna Fail deal to found a ‘new republic’ and then to ‘give the new republic a chance’ in a way that would really give capitalism a chance to get its irons out of the fire.

Likewise there would probably be those who believed that if they occupied the Central Bank Plaza in Dame St. or went on hunger strike outside the GPO for long enough or scaled the gates of Leinster House with a hundred people or so the system would some how fall at their feet. And the failure of this to happen would actually assist the nationalist/reformist project by not reaching out to and convincing the majority.

Therefore there has to be an organised, cohesive body able to focus the movement on acting decisively to take power, not tomorrow or next week, but when the opportunity really arises. This is not a question of acting on behalf of the masses but winning the masses themselves to the need to overthrow the state and take over the running of the state through their own democratic assemblies.

The central lesson is that the revolutionary party has to be built and trained in advance of the revolution. It is the tragedy of Ireland’s greatest revolutionary socialist, James Connolly, that he was not able to do this.

Our opportunity

The key point of this article is not just the more or less timeless truth that building the revolutionary party needs to be done but that right now, here in Ireland, North and South, we have a particular opportunity to actually do it, or make significant progress towards doing it. A glance at history and the world situation today shows that since the marginalisation of genuine revolutionary socialism by the rise of Stalinism and the victory of fascism in the 1930s it has been extremely difficult to build substantial revolutionary workers’ parties anywhere so this claim needs substantiation.

The basis for it is the evident radicalisation of substantial sections of the Irish working class both South and North. In the South the clearest expression of this has been the mass anti-water charges movement which achieved a scale of mobilisation in working class communities that was truly exceptional. However it is important to understand that the water revolt gave vent to years of accumulated anger over the economic crash, the bank bail-out, wage cuts, the USC, the Household Charge, community cuts, health cuts, the housing crisis and everything else associated with austerity. It was often said the water charges were ‘the straw that broke the camel’s back’. There was an element of truth in this but it didn’t quite capture what happened. It wasn’t so much that water charges were one more piece of pain that crossed some pain threshold and caused an explosion of rage as that water charges were a piece of pain that the working class felt it could do something about.

If you walk over the Ha’penny Bridge the sight of the homeless begging is heartbreaking but what can you do immediately except put a euro in a cup, which solves nothing. If you take your child or elderly parent to A&E and wait 10 hours in a war zone for treatment it leaves you fuming but feeling powerless. And when you refused to pay the Household Charge they changed the name and the rules so that they could take it out of your wages and that reinforced the sense of bitter resignation. But when you hear that for water charges they have to install a water meter outside your front door and that they can’t take it out of your wages or pension, that is something you, and your neighbours, CAN resist – and they did, massively. So the water charges became the lightning rod for all the anger at austerity and growing inequality. And, as we know, people who engage in active resistance radicalise – they broaden their horizons and move leftwards.

Another important sign of this was the magnificent yes vote on marriage equality which was particularly high in working class areas. Of course some of this radicalisation, especially at the start, took the form of hostility to all politics and political parties but overall people involved in the water charges struggle abandoned the traditional mainstream [FG/FF/Lab] and became open to supporting alternatives – Sinn Fein, independents and, crucially, the AAA-PBP alliance. There are also signs that a revival in workplace and trade union struggle may be underway with the very important Luas workers strike plus Tesco workers, teachers, and nurses involved in disputes, which would add a vital extra ingredient to the mix. Thus there is a much expanded audience for socialist and revolutionary ideas.

In the North there has been no mass struggle like the water charges but there have been large trade union led one-day strikes and demonstrations against cuts and job losses and numerous small campaigns and at the same time the emergence of a new generation fed up with, and anxious to move beyond, the old sectarian conflicts of the past. In a way the lightning rod for all this discontent has been the People Before Profit election campaign itself, especially that of Gerry Carroll in West Belfast, which itself seemed to take on some of the characteristics of a social movement. So again there is a much expanded audience for socialism in the North.

The opportunity created by this radicalisation of the working class is enhanced by certain specific features of the political landscape. In the North the fact that Sinn Fein is implementing austerity in coalition with the DUP has created a substantial political space to their left. Moreover there is no significant left reformist formation, no Syriza or Podemos or Sanders or Corbyn, able to occupy that space. There are, of course, the dissidents and a few others on the left but People Before Profit has a relatively clear run at it.

In the South our opportunity benefits from a) the damage done to Fianna Fail, which used to have a mass working class vote, to by the crash and its aftermath – damage from which it has still not really recovered; b) the implosion of the Labour Party; c) the failure of Sinn Fein to convince large numbers of working people of their trustworthiness and so achieve the degree of electoral advance that they and others expected.

The historically much lamented weakness of the Irish left in both jurisdictions, i.e. the absence of mass reformist parties comparable to the British Labour Party, German Social Democracy or various European Communist Parties, thus turns into our opportunity[6]. The substantial success People Before Profit has already had in seizing that opportunity further increases the possibility of building a serious revolutionary party.

People Before Profit is not a revolutionary socialist party but neither is it a reformist party. It contains no organised reformist wing and has no careerist or privileged bureaucracy[7] and no dependency on a section of the trade union bureaucracy – frequently a crucial underpinning of reformist and left reformist parties. Rather People Before Profit is a political formation in which revolutionaries operate freely and openly but where there is also space for people who are not revolutionaries but want to fight austerity and the system, many of whom are not opposed to revolution but who have not, or have not yet, thought the issue of revolution and the revolutionary party through. It is important that this space continues to remain open and protected but in so far as it grows, and the chance is there for it grow significantly, it is also creates the possibility of drawing people into the revolutionary party.


How to build the Party

At any point in time there are always some individuals who can be won to the revolutionary party just on the basis of ideas (and it is always necessary to do this). But a significant, large revolutionary workers party cannot be built apart from or separate from the mass movement of working people.

The party and its members must always be part of and engaged in the actual struggles of working people, helping those struggles to develop and win – as we have done in Ireland over the water charges and many other campaigns ( household charges, Forests, bin charges, Luas workers, Greyhound workers etc, etc,.) It is in these struggles that people radicalise and open up to new ideas. By working alongside them socialists can win their respect, influence them and win them to socialism and revolution..

But if the party cannot be built outside of the mass movement neither can it be built by just merging with the movement and dropping wider political issues. It is perfectly possible to be bitterly opposed to water charges or passionate about tackling the housing crisis while at the same time being hostile to refugees or immigrants. This has to be challenged and argued with. We need a water charges movement and a housing movement (and a working class movement generally) with an anti-racist culture.

This is not a matter of abstract moral principle. Some socialists are vegetarian on principle – they believe it is morally wrong to eat meat – but it is not necessary to challenge meat eating in the movement. This is because racism can be used (and various right wing political forces will use it) to divert, split and derail the whole mass movement, in a way that cannot be done with non-vegetarianism.

The same is true of a woman’s right to choose and the question of sexism and of homophobia etc. These are major issues in Irish society and it is not possible to build a party that is not unequivocal on these matters. Individual newly radicalising people may need convincing and that should be approached sensitively but the issues cannot be ducked or swept under the carpet.

Similarly in any popular grass roots campaign, especially in its early stages, there will always be those who say ‘this should be non-political’ or that ‘political parties should leave their banners, papers and ideas at the door’ etc. We have to resist this. They will say that politics puts people off but this is not true. The biggest demonstrations in Irish history – the water charges demos – had thousands of political placards and political literature freely available. The same is true internationally, e.g. the great anti-Iraq war demos of 2003 which mobilized up to 2 million in London and over 100,000 in Dublin and maybe 35 million globally, were filled with political placards. No one was put off by this.

Sometimes tactical compromises will be necessary but in general we are for campaigns and movements and demos in which all progressive parties who support the goals of the movement are welcome with their banners and literature.

Also to build the party we have to actively recruit, which means not only issuing general calls but also identifying likely individuals, talking to them and asking them to join..

Party building and campaigning always have to be combined. But exactly how and in what proportion depends on circumstances. For example the balance is different in the middle of an election campaign and after it or on the first approach to a picket line and on the fourth or fifth.

How to do this is an art: it cannot be reduced to a fixed set of rules but has to be learned in practice. This learning process is a collective one in which we share experiences, from the past and the present and from different areas.


Without recruitment no revolutionary party can survive let alone grow, but recruitment (signing the form) is simply the start of the process. New members have to be integrated, involved and educated. No one is born a socialist and they don’t teach socialism in school. But if people don’t develop a rounded socialist outlook they will not survive the constant battering from the media. This has to be done in branches. Recruitment and growth means branch building – that means regular and interesting meetings which link practice and theory, agitation, propaganda and education.

All of this can only be done effectively if there is a shared perspective of building a revolutionary party, based on an understanding of the opportunity we now have and the necessity of seizing it.











[1] See John Molyneux, ‘Marxism and Trade Unionism’, Irish Marxist Review 1.
[2] See V.I.Lenin, The State and Revolution     and James O’Toole  Socialists and Left Government  Irish Marxist Review 12.
[3] See Kieran Allen, 1916: Ireland’s Revolutionary Tradition,  London, 2016, Ch 3-5.
[4] See John Molyneux, ‘Lessons from the Egyptian Revolution’, Irish Marxist Review 13. http://irishmarxistreview.net/index.php/imr/article/view/165

[5] In 2013 the main Nasserist leader, Hamdeen Sabahy, who had been a major opponent of Mubarak and  the Iraq War and was seen as sympathetic to the left, explicitly gave his backing to Sisi’s military coup, as did a number of leading Nasserist trade unionists.
[6] There is an interesting historical parallel here in that the Bolshevik Party was successfully built in Russia where reformism was exceptionally weak in comparison with most of Europe, and Trotskyism  in the sixties did relatively well in countries (Britain, USA) where Stalinism was weak.
[7] On this point PBP’s problem hitherto has been having too little bureaucracy, not too much.

Shakespeare 400 years on

Shakespeare 400 years on.

John Molyneux

This article first appeared in Irish Marxist Review 15

2016 is a year of many anniversaries. Easter 1916 we know about of course but it is also sixty years on from the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party and the exposure of the crimes of Stalin by Khrushchev, from the Suez Crisis and the Hungarian Revolution, the centenary of the Battle of the Somme and it is the four hundredth anniversary of the death of Shakespeare.

So much has been written about Shakespeare that there’s a reasonable case for never writing another word. That this vast literature includes much from a Marxist perspective beginning with Marx himself and ranging through Trotsky and Lukacs to Paul Siegel and Michael Rosen strengthens the argument for silence as does the circumstance that, due to other priorities, what follows is going to be written at speed and with no time for scholarship or a proper academic apparatus.(quotations, references, bibliography etc).  Nevertheless it’s the 400th anniversary and we should say something. My only other excuse is that having been an art historian rather than a literary specialist this gives a slightly different vantage point for a few, hopefully interesting, observations.

I want to suggest that it is useful to view Shakespeare in the context of two other giants of European culture – Michelangelo and Rembrandt. Let us begin by noting that in chronological terms Shakespeare stands almost exactly between the other two. Shakespeare was born in 1564, the year of Michelangelo’s death, and died in 1616, just ten years after the birth of Rembrandt.

What unites these three immense figures is that they are products of the epoch that can be described as the birth of capitalism and which Engels referred to as, ‘the greatest progressive revolution that mankind has so far experienced, a time which called for giants and produced giants - giants in power of thought, passion, and character, in universality and learning’ noting that, ‘The men who founded the modern rule of the bourgeoisie had anything but bourgeois limitations’.[1] As a consequence the work of all of them expresses a huge expansion of the role of the individual and a great development of the human personality in society and art. Compare Michelangelo’s David or his Moses with the frescoes of Giotto or the sculpture of Donatello; or the eighty self portraits of Rembrandt with portraits by Van Eyck or Holbein; above all compare the plays of Shakespeare with Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales and the complexity of Hamlet with any character in literature of the previous thousand years.

What Michelangelo, Shakespeare and Rembrandt also share, perhaps surprisingly, is a tragic vision of life. It is as if they have some presentiment that this extraordinary new departure in human history, liberating and intoxicating as it is, is going to end in tears. On closer inspection, however, it is possible to discern more specific causes of their sadness, which in turn derive from the fact each is a product of a different phase in the transition from feudalism to capitalism.

Michelangelo represents an early phase. It was the Italian city states of Venice and Florence that led the way in the development of capitalism within an overarching feudal framework. But the Italian bourgeoisie failed to break through; its leading representatives, the Medici bankers, joined the aristocratic/ Catholic counterrevolution and in the early years of the sixteenth century the Italian national democratic revolution was thrown back (not to re-emerge till Mazzini and Garibaldi in the 19th Century). It was experiencing this process that transformed Michelangelo’s outlook from the optimistic humanism of David and The Creation of Adam on the Sistine Ceiling to the horror of The Last Judgement on the Sistine Altar Wall and the sorrow of his late Piétas.[2]

Rembrandt comes from a later phase after the first successful bourgeois revolution, (the Dutch Revolt) and after the establishment of the first bourgeois state in the Dutch Republic. Rembrandt benefits from the economic and social progress this brings – it makes the Dutch Republic, temporarily, the most prosperous, liberal and advanced society in Europe. But he also reacts intuitively (he has no political critique) against the cold economic rationalism of the new capitalist order and identifies more and more in his work with its victims: the beggars, the poor, the Jews and other outsiders.[3]

Shakepeare is an intermediate figure. He emerges in the period preceding the English Revolution of 1642 when the contradictions in English society are starting to come to a head. The bourgeoisie, to which Shakespeare is affiliated, is advancing and the feudal aristocracy is declining, with the balance between the two being held by the ‘absolute’ monarchies of Elizabeth I and James I. Shakespeare’s world view is correspondingly complex – far too complex to be properly reviewed here. However, I want to highlight two features of it which I think are of particular interest to socialists and Marxists.

The first is his attitude to money. According to Marx, ‘Shakespeare excellently depicts the real nature of money’. In the section on ‘Money’ in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844 Marx quotes extensively from Timon of Athens

“Gold? Yellow, glittering, precious gold?
No, Gods, I am no idle votarist! ...
Thus much of this will make black white, foul fair,
Wrong right, base noble, old young, coward valiant.
... Why, this
Will lug your priests and servants from your sides,
Pluck stout men’s pillows from below their heads:
This yellow slave
Will knit and break religions, bless the accursed;
Make the hoar leprosy adored, place thieves
And give them title, knee and approbation
With senators on the bench…etc
And…
“O thou sweet king-killer, and dear divorce
‘Twixt natural son and sire! thou bright defiler
Of Hymen’s purest bed! thou valiant Mars!
Thou ever young, fresh, loved and delicate wooer,
Whose blush doth thaw the consecrated snow
That lies on Dian’s lap! Thou
visible God! Etc…[4]
Shakespeare, says Marx,
 stresses especially two properties of money:
1. It is the visible divinity — the transformation of all human and natural properties into their contraries, the universal confounding and distorting of things: impossibilities are soldered together by it.
2. It is the common whore, the common procurer of people and nations.
The distorting and confounding of all human and natural qualities, the fraternisation of impossibilities — the divine power of money — lies in its character as men’s estranged, alienating and self-disposing species-nature. Money is the alienated ability of mankind.[5]

And just as Marx can use Shakespeare to analyse the power of money so Marx can be used to sum up the essence of world depicted in Timon of Athens.
The bourgeoisie, wherever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. It has pitilessly torn asunder the motley feudal ties that bound man to his “natural superiors”, and has left remaining no other nexus between man and man than naked self-interest, than callous “cash payment”. It has drowned the most heavenly ecstasies of religious fervour, of chivalrous enthusiasm, of philistine sentimentalism, in the icy water of egotistical calculation. [6]
Shakespeare’s hostility to money and money grubbing is not confined to Timon of Athens. It is also the theme of The Merchant of Venice. This fact has largely been obscured by the controversy about the play’s alleged anti-semitism, but whether or not Shylock is an anti-semitic stereotype, he is a money lender and the judgment of Portia is not only a condemnation of Shylock but also of the logic of money lending, of usury.

As regards Shakespeare’s understanding of, and hostility to, money, it is necessary to understand that money was then ‘an issue’ in the way that it has seldom been since. This was because although money as such had been around for millennia, the rule of money, its all pervasive domination of society, was something new, arriving hand in hand with the development of capitalism and its key characteristic, generalized commodity production, and therefore a matter of debate (in a way that it was not in later ages which took it for granted.) Luther and others made corruption and especially the buying and selling of indulgences a central feature of their critique of the Church. At the same time John Calvin, the key ‘ideologist’ of the Dutch Revolution, wrote an article arguing specifically that usury was NOT a sin[7]. The Catholic Church’s condemnation of usury was rooted in its feudal opposition to capitalism and the need to keep bankers, money lenders, and aspirant bourgeois in their place.
Second, and more important, is Shakespeare’s attitude to power. If Shakespeare understands but despises the power of money his distaste for power – political power- is even more intense and pervasive. All his history plays focus on the struggle for power. Richard II, which is a story of plotting and counter-plotting, shows the human weaknesses that make a man unfit to be king.  Richard III is about a man who kills, and kills and kills again, including children, to gain and retain power until he himself is killed. Macbeth is about a man (and a woman) who kills and kills and kills again, including a child, to gain and retain power until he is ‘in blood stepp’d in so far…returning were as tedious as go’er’. Hamlet is about a man who fails to gain power and loses his life because he is not capable of ruthless cold blooded murder. Prince Hal’s transformation into the man of power, King Henry V, involves the repudiation of, and crushing of his own feelings for, Falstaff. Coriolanus deals with the arrogance of aristocratic power; King Lear with a man who wants to have it both ways – to divest himself of the responsibility and burdens of power but still be treated with the respect due to a king; but who also through his downfall and descent into madness somehow regains his humanity.  Above all, Antony and Cleopatra depicts the radical contradiction between the logic of power and the logic of love.
Shakespeare’s heroes, including his tragic heroes, are people of passion – Lear, Othello. Coriolanus, Antony, Romeo etc – and often they are betrayed by their passions. His victors, those who end up holding the reigns of power – Malcolm, Fortinbras, Bolingbroke, Octavius – are not his heroes. They are secondary figures who pass quietly through the main action – like the ‘grey blur’ Stalin through the Russian Revolution - to pick up the crown amid the carnage. They are men of ‘cold calculation’ with ice in their veins. Psychologically they are closest to his outright villains like Iago, Goneril, Regan and Edmund.
The roots of this focus on the anti-human ruthlessness of power in the historical period are not hard to discern. English history over the preceding centuries had been a more or less continuous inter and intra-familial armed struggle for power which in so far as it had achieved a temporary equilibrium had done so on the basis of severe violence. Elizabethan England was to all intents and purposes a police state
In the most the most influential book on Shakespeare of the 1960s Shakespeare, Our Contemporary, the Polish critic Jan Kott pointed to the parallel between this and his experience of Stalinism “Kott is undoubtedly the only writer on Elizabethan matters who assumes … that every one of his readers will at some point or other have been woken by the police in the middle of the night” wrote the great theatre director, Peter Brook, in his Introduction to Shakespeare,Our Contemporary.
It appears that the notion of Shakespeare as our contemporary is no longer in fashion in academic circles. No matter.  Four hundred years on in the world of Donald Trump and Hilary Clinton, Vladimir Putin and the oligarchs, the IMF and the ECB the themes of money and power can hardly be said to have lost their relevance.
One of the functions of serious art is to assist us in the understanding, concrete and intimate rather than theoretical understanding, of our social relations, that is our relations with our fellow human beings. The greatest of those who wrote (and painted and sculpted) at the moment of capitalism’s birth saw the social relations characteristic of the system with fresh and critical eyes as opposed to taking them for granted as so many later artists and thinkers have done. And this is one reason why they – and above all Shakespeare – still have so much to say to us today.










[1] Frederick Engels, ‘Introduction to The Dialectics of Nature,’ https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1883/don/ch01.htm

[2] This is a compressed version of the argument presented in John Molyneux ‘Michelangelo and Human Emancipation’ in International Socialism Journal, 128, http://isj.org.uk/michelangelo-and-human-emancipation/

[3] See John Molyneux,Rembrandt and Revolution  Red Words, London 2001.
[4] Karl Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Moscow 1967, pp.127-8. https://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1844/manuscripts/power.htm

[5] As above p.129
[6] The Communist Manifesto.
[7] Richard H. Tawney, Religion and the Rise of Capitalism , New York1927: p. 95.

Saturday, June 11, 2016

What is Fascism?




Socialism #1.01 written for Irish Socialist Worker.

John Molyneux

What is Fascism?

Is Trump a fascist? It is a reasonable question to ask given that Trump is a right wing racist, misogynistic, homophobic, imperialist bigot and bully and that there is also no shortage of people willing to call him a fascist.

In actual fact he’s not: he’s a right wing racist, misogynistic, homophobic, imperialist bigot and bully, but not a fascist – at least not yet.

Understanding why this is so helps us to understand what fascism was and what it is today – the better to recognise it and defeat it whenever it appears.

Fascism was a mass counterrevolutionary movement that arose in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s. It took power first in Italy (where the name ‘fascism’ came from) led by Mussolini, then in Germany (where it was known as Nazism) and then in Austria, Spain, Portugal and elsewhere. Fascist movement of various degrees of strength arose in most countries in this period, including France, Britain and Ireland.

Nazis

Racism, nationalism, sexism, homophobia and authoritarianism were all features of fascist ideology – in the case of the Nazis anti-semitism played a crucial role – but they were not its defining characteristics and they are much more widespread than fascism.

Let’s be clear – all these reactionary ideological themes have been around a lot longer than fascism. Victorian England, for example, was very racist, nationalistic, sexist and homophobic and, obviously, highly imperialist; it was not fascist. Ireland in the 1950s was certainly conservative, nationalist, racist, sexist and homophobic; it was not fascist.

The USA today, despite Obama, is deeply racist as it has been since its foundation (witness the regular police murder of black people), very sexist in many ways, nationalistic and imperialist and has a horribly brutal penal system; it is not a fascist state.

What distinguished fascism historically was that it was a movement, largely based on the lower middle classes enraged by the economic crisis, which existed both within and outside the ‘normal’ framework of elections and parliamentary politics and which could be, and was,  used as a counter-revolutionary fighting force against ‘communists’, ‘socialists’ and the labour movement as a whole.

Regimes

What distinguished the fascist regimes was that they dispensed with parliamentary democracy and crushed and broke up all forms of independent opposition, especially opposition from the workers’ movement - trade unions, socialist parties and the like.

It was these characteristics, not just reactionary ideas or even extreme brutality (which sadly has been a feature of the whole history of class society), that made fascism so useful to the capitalist class in times of economic and political crisis and such a mortal threat to the working class and the left – literally a matter of life and death.

It was also a key feature of these fascist movements that they arose mainly from the lower middle class who were enraged at their treatment by the banks and big capital and so deployed a certain anti-banker, anti- capitalist rhetoric. But they came to power, not just by their own strength, but with the support of the capitalist class, and in power they governed in the interests of that class.

This brings us back to Trump. Trump is not (yet) a fascist, not because he is some kind of liberal but because he hasn’t sought to organise an extra-parliamentary movement on the streets which can take on the left and the workers. He could do this in the future but he hasn’t done it yet.

Neither has Nigel Farage of UKIP in Britain, who is also a far right racist populist, but not a fascist.

However, this doesn’t mean there is no fascist threat. Unfortunately across Europe there are a number of significant fascist movements and parties which have grown during the austerity years: they include Golden Dawn in Greece, Jobbik in Hungary, and the Front National in France.

In Britain there was the BNP but they have largely fallen apart. In addition there are many smaller groups and movements, like the EDL and various Pegida outfits who would like to be able to establish serious fascist parties. So there is no room for complacency.

Combating fascism is a vital task for socialists and the left. It requires both mobilising against them on the streets and building a major challenge to austerity and the system from the left.

In Ireland there has been no significant fascist movement since Eoin O’Duffy’s Blue Shirts in the 1930s. We need to keep it that way.

That’s why the highly effective mobilisation against Pegida Ireland before the election was an important victory for the left.